

Message Text

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TO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PRETORIA
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USDEL MBFR VIENNA
USMISSION NATO
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN

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EXDIS USOECD FOR OECD PARIS: CAPE TOWN FOR EMB

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PINT, PINS, PORG, PDEV, ENRG, EAID, MASS, GW, UR, TU
SF, CU, IS, US

SUBJECT: FRG FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER'S MEETING WITH
SECRETARY VANCE

SUMMARY: ON HIS WAY FROM MEXICO CITY TO PARIS JUNE 10, FRG
FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER STOPPED OFF BRIEFLY IN WASHING-
TON FOR WIDE RANGING DISCUSSION OF CURRENT ISSUES WITH
THE SECRETARY. GENSCHER SAID THAT HE PREFERRED THAT

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BREZHNEV VISIT THE FRG ONLY AFTER HIS PROJECTED US TRIP.
DURING HIS OWN MOSCOW VISIT HE EXPECTED THE FOCUS TO BE
ON BELGRADE CONFERENCE, MBFR, ROLE OF WARSAW PACT IN
NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE, AFRICA, AND THE MIDDLE EAST. THE
SECRETARY REITERATED THAT AT BELGRADE WE WANTED FRANK
AND STRAIGHTFORWARD REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION BUT WOULD
AVOID POLEMICS. THE SOVIETS ALSO SEEMED TO WANT NON-
CONFRONTATIONAL APPROACH. ON SALT, SECRETARY STRESSED THAT
PROGRESS WAS SLOW, BUT THAT WE WERE NOW ON AN ESTABLISHED

NEGOTIATING TRACK. GENSCHER EXPRESSED FRG CONCERN OVER RANGE OF SOVIET HEAVY MISSILES AS WELL AS THAT OF CRUISE MISSILES. GENSCHER PREDICTED THAT ON MBFR FRG WOULD FACE HEAVY BARRAGE OF PROPAGANDA NOT ONLY FROM EAST, BUT FROM ALL SIDES. HE STRESSED NEED TO REJECT INCLUSION OF NATIONAL SUB-CEILINGS IN NEGOTIATIONS. IT WOULD BE

ACCEPTABLE TO PRESENT SOVIETS WITH AGGREGATE FIGURES OF MAJOR UNITS BUT NOT TO BREAK DOWN SMALLER UNITS INTO INDIVIDUAL NATIONAL FIGURES. IN DISCUSSION OF SOUTHERN AFRICA GENSCHER MENTIONED THREE FRG DECISIONS ON NAMIBIA: INTEGRATION NEXT YEAR OF GERMAN SCHOOL IN WINDHOEK, NOTICE TO SOUTH AFRICA THAT NAMIBIA WOULD NOT BE INCLUDED IN NEXT BILATERAL CULTURAL AGREEMENT, AND DECISION TO CLOSE FRG CONSULATE IN WINDHOEK AUGUST 1. IN DISCUSSION OF CIEC, GENSCHER NOTED TWO STRUCTURAL WEAKNESSES: WHILE EIGHT INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES WERE FULLY REPRESENTED, GROUP OF 77 WAS HARDLY REPRESENTED AT ALL; SECONDLY, LDC'S WERE LARGELY REPRESENTED BY PRESENT OR POTENTIAL OPEC COUNTRIES RATHER THAN AS INDEPENDENT GROUP. DISCUSSION ALSO INCLUDED EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON NEW GOVERNMENTS IN TURKEY AND ISRAEL AND DEVELOPMENT OF US RELATIONS WITH CUBA. END SUMMARY.

1. FRG-SOVIET RELATIONS: CONCERNING GENSCHER'S FORTHCOMING VISIT TO MOSCOW, HE SAID THAT A DATE FOR BREZHNEV'S VISIT TO BONN WOULD BE ON THE AGENDA. HE

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UNDERSTOOD THAT BREZHNEV WAS ALSO COMING TO THE US AND WOULD LIKE TO SEE HIM VISIT THE FRG ONLY AFTER THE US TRIP. THERE REMAINED THE OPEN PROBLEM OF THE THREE BILATERAL AGREEMENTS STILL UNRESOLVED BECAUSE OF THE BERLIN ISSUE. THE GERMAN POSITION ON THESE AGREEMENTS HAD NOT CHANGED. HOWEVER, THESE AGREEMENTS WOULD NOT BE THE CENTRAL ISSUE IN HIS MOSCOW TALKS, WHICH WOULD FOCUS ON THE BELGRADE CONFERENCE, THE MIDDLE EAST, AFRICA, THE ROLE OF THE WARSAW PACT STATES IN THE NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE AND MBFR. CONCERNING THE LATTER POINT, HE RECALLED THAT GROMYKO HAD OFFERED AT LAST YEAR'S UNGA TO MAKE CONCESSIONS IN THE BERLIN AREA IF THE FRG WOULD BE FORTHCOMING IN THE MBFR CONTEXT.

2. CSCE PREPARATIONS: VANCE SAID OUR POSITION WITH REGARD TO BELGRADE WAS UNCHANGED. WE INTENDED TO CONCENTRATE ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. THE US WANTED A FRANK AND STRAIGHTFORWARD REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION BUT WOULD AVOID POLEMICS. THE MAJORITY OF THE CSCE COMMISSION SUPPORTED THIS VIEW. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT NONETHELESS WE AND THE FRG WOULD HAVE TO CONFER ON OUR POSITIONS AS WE APPROACHED BELGRADE. IN ANSWER TO

GENSCHER'S QUESTION, HE SAID THAT THE LEADER OF THE US DELEGATION WOULD BE DEPUTY SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER, AND THAT THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE GROUP WOULD BE AMBASSADOR SHERER. GENSCHER SAID HE WAS VERY PLEASED TO LEARN OF THE HIGH RANK OF THE US REPRESENTATIVES. THE FRG SIDE WOULD BE REPRESENTED BY GUENTHER VAN WELL, WITH PER FISCHER AS THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR. HE NOTED THAT FISCHER HAD FORMERLY BEEN THE GERMAN ABASSADOR TO ISRAEL. GENSCHER ASKED THE SECRETARY HOW HE ASSESSED THE SOVIET REACTION TO THE USG CSCE REPORT. THE SECRETARY SAID HE HAD TALKED TO THE SOVIETS YESTERDAY, AND THEY HAD SEEMED FAIRLY RELAXED. GENSCHER SAID THAT THE GDR HAD REACTED MUCH MORE SHARPLY, APPARENTLY IN RESPONSE TO THE WEST GERMAN

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NEWS MEDIA'S STRESS ON THE BERLIN ASPECT OF OUR REPORT.

3. SALT: SECRETARY VANCE REPORTED ON SALT, STATING THAT PROGRESS WAS VERY SLOW, THAT THE ISSUES BETWEEN US REMAINED SHARP ON CRUISE AND HEAVY MISSILES, ON BACKFIRE, AND ON THE QUESTION OF WHAT WENT WHERE IN THE PROPOSED THREE-PHASE STRUCTURE. HOWEVER, THE ATMOSPHERE HAD BEEN GOOD WITH GROMYKO IN GENEVA. WE WOULD CONTINUE TO DISCUSS SALT AT THREE LEVELS DURING THE SUMMER: FIRST AT THE TECHNICAL LEVEL, SECOND, BETWEEN THE SECRETARY AND DOBRYNIN HERE, AND THIRD, WITH GROMYKO IN VIENNA IN THE FIRST WEEK OF SEPTEMBER. GROMYKO WOULD THEN COME TO THE US AT THE END OF SEPTEMBER TO ATTEND THE UNGA, AND THERE WOULD BE FURTHER BILATERALS THEN. IT WAS A LONG PROCESS, BUT WE WERE NOW ON A SET NEGOTIATING TRACK. THE US SIDE WAS SETTING NO TIME LIMIT, AND WE ARE NOT RUSHING TO GET AN AGREEMENT.

4. GENSCHER SAID THAT WHAT WAS OF GREAT CONCERN TO THE FRG WAS THE RANGE OF THE SOVIET HEAVY MISSILES. HE WAS ALSO INTERESTED IN THE RANGE OF THE CRUISE MISSILES IN A SALT AGREEMENT. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT THIS RAISED THE QUESTION OF NON-CIRCUMVENTION. WARNKE WOULD BE RAISING THIS SUBJECT IN NATO, AND AFTER THAT DISCUSSION, AND AFTER A NATO POSITION HAD BEEN DEVELOPED, WE WOULD WANT TO RAISE THIS SUBJECT QUICKLY WITH THE SOVIETS. IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR US TO HAVE THE INITIATIVE IN THIS AREA, AND WE WANTED TO HAVE BROAD LANGUAGE ON NON-CIRCUMVENTION TO PUT FORWARD TO THE SOVIETS. HENCE OUR DESIRE TO TAKE UP THE MATTER EARLY IN NATO. WARNKE HAD BEEN URGED TO GET OUR PROPOSALS TO NATO AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

5. MBFR: THE SECRETARY ASKED WHAT THE SOVIETS WOULD DISCUSS ON MBFR WITH GENSCHER IN MOSCOW. GENSCHER

RESPONDED THAT AT THE 1976 UNGA GROMYKO HAD INSISTED

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TO HIM THAT THE GERMANS NOT DWELL INCLUSIVELY ON PARITY AND COMMON CEILINGS. HE THOUGHT GROMYKO WOULD COME BACK TO THIS POINT. GENSCHER THOUGHT THE FRG WOULD FACE A REAL PROPAGANDA OFFENSIVE OVER MBFR; NOT ONLY FROM THE EAST, BUT ALSO FROM WESTERN EUROPEANS AND PERHAPS EVEN THE US. MANY PEOPLE SEEMED TO THINK MBFR MEANT DISARMAMENT FOR THE SOVIET UNION, WHICH WAS SIMPLY NOT THE CASE. THE SOVIETS SIMPLY WANTED TO MOVE A LITTLE TO THE EAST WHILE HAVING THE US MOVE ALL THE WAY BACK TO ITS SHORES. THE WEST HAD TO BE VERY CAREFUL TO REJECT ANY EFFORT TO HAVE NATIONAL SUB-CEILINGS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. IT WAS THEREFORE IMPORTANT TO BE CAREFUL AS TO HOW WE HANDLE THE DATA QUESTION. IT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO PRESENT THE SOVIETS WITH AGGREGATE FIGURES OF MAJOR UNITS, BUT NOT TO BREAK DOWN SMALL UNITS INTO INDIVIDUAL NATIONAL FIGURES. IF WE MOVED TOWARD THE LATTER STEP, THIS WOULD ALLOW THE OTHER SIDE TO ARRIVE AT NATIONAL TOTALS. HE SAID THAT THE GERMAN PROPOSAL ON DATA RECENTLY PUT FORWARD IN NATO HAD NOT EXACTLY BEEN WARMLY RECEIVED. OTHER DELEGATIONS, EVEN THE US, HAD MADE CRITICAL REMARKS ABOUT IT. HE WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF THE US AND THE OTHER DELEGATIONS WOULD REVIEW THEIR POSITIONS, AND THE FRG WOULD REVIEW ITS OWN. HE WOULD ALSO INSTRUCT THE FRG DELEGATION IN NATO TO WORK CLOSELY WITH THE US SIDE. VANCE RESPONDED THAT OUR DIFFICULTY WITH THE GERMAN PROPOSAL WAS THAT IF NON-COMBAT UNITS WERE NOT INCLUDED, THEN WE COULD NOT RESOLVE THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN OUR ESTIMATES OF EASTERN FORCES AND THE NUMBERS THEY HAD PRESENTED. GENSCHER SAID THAT HE WAS PREPARED TO HAVE A FULL DISCUSSION OF THE FRG DATA PROPOSAL TO FIND A COMMON LINE. THIS DISCUSSION SHOULD PERMIT THE WESTERN SIDE TO RESOLVE THE DIVERGENCIES BETWEEN THE FIGURES, BUT WE OUGHT NOT TO ANTICIPATE THE ACTUAL NEGOTIATIONS. VANCE SAID HE ENTIRELY AGREED THAT THERE SHOULD BE A BROAD DISCUSSION TO WORK OUT A COMMON POSITION, WHICH MIGHT BE DISCUSSED FURTHER BETWEEN THEM

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AT THE UPCOMING MEETING IN PARIS.

6. TURKEY: VANCE ASKED FOR GENSCHER'S VIEWS ON THE SITUATION IN TURKEY. GENSCHER SAID WE WOULD HAVE TO WAIT TO SEE WHETHER ECEVIT COULD GAIN A MAJORITY TO SEE WHAT SORT OF POLICY HE WOULD FOLLOW, AND WHAT HE WOULD DO VIS-A-VIS THE ALLIANCE. THE SECRETARY THOUGHT THAT ECEVIT

WOULD STAY IN THE ALLIANCE, WOULD PROBABLY BE MORE FLEXIBLE ON CYPRUS THAN DEMIREL, BUT MIGHT BE HOBbled BY HIS COALITION PARTNER ON THE AEGEAN TALKS. HE AGREED WE WOULD ALL HAVE TO WAIT AND SEE.

7. ISRAEL: ASKED ABOUT THE SITUATION IN ISRAEL, VANCE SAID THAT THE BEST GUESS WAS THAT BEGIN WOULD PUT TOGETHER A COALITION OF VARIOUS RELIGIOUS AND SPLINTER GROUPS. IT WAS DIFFICULT TO KNOW EXACTLY WHERE BEGIN STOOD ON THE ISSUES, AND TO JUDGE WHAT FLEXIBILITY HE WOULD BRING TO HIS OFFICE. BEGIN WOULD PROBABLY COME HERE AT THE END OF THIS MONTH OR IN EARLY JULY, AND VANCE WOULD THEN MAKE A RETURN TRIP TO ISRAEL. GENSCHER SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN IN ISRAEL IN MARCH, AND HAD MET WITH THE LEADER OF ONE OF THE TWO LIBERAL PARTIES THERE. THE LIBERAL LEADER HAD THOUGHT HIS PARTY COULD WORK WITH BEGIN AND PUSH HIM TO TAKE A MORE FLEXIBLE ATTITUDE. GENSCHER SAID THERE WAS A BAD PROBLEM FOR THE GERMANS WITH BEGIN IN THAT HE HAD REFUSED PREVIOUSLY TO MEET WITH ANY GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE. BEGIN NOW SAID THAT HE WOULD MEET WITH GERMANS AFTER HE HAD FORMALLY ASSUMED OFFICE.

8. SOUTHERN AFRICA: THE SECRETARY SAID THAT ON SOUTHERN AFRICA, THE FIRST ROUND OF TALKS HAD BEEN USEFUL. WE HAD TALKED TO ALL SIDES INVOLVED, AND THE RESULTS HAD BEEN PROMISING ENOUGH TO LEAD US TO A SECOND ROUND, WHERE WE HOPED TO GET INTO THE DETAILS OF A CONSTITUTION. WE WOULD START DISCUSSIONS NEXT WEEK, ALONG WITH THE BRITISH,

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BUT WE DO NOT KNOW WHERE THESE WOULD COME OUT. IF THE RESULTS WERE GOOD ENOUGH, OWEN WOULD CALL FOR A CONFERENCE TO DISCUSS THE DRAFT CONSTITUTIONS AT LANCASTER HOUSE. IF THESE WERE SUCCESSFUL, THEN THE CONSTITUTION WOULD BE PUT TO THE RHODESIAN AND BRITISH PARLIAMENTS. IF THEY APPROVED IT, THEN A DATE WOULD BE SET FOR THE TAKE-OVER BY A TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT. HE SAID THERE WERE OBVIOUSLY A LOT OF IFS IN THIS SITUATION.

9. GENSCHER SAID THAT HE WANTED TO MENTION THREE IMPORTANT DECISIONS THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAD REACHED ON NAMIBIA. FIRST OF ALL, BEGINNING WITH THE 1978 SCHOOL YEAR, THE GERMAN SCHOOL IN WINDHOEK WOULD HAVE TO BE OPEN TO BLACK CHILDREN; OTHERWISE THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WOULD NO LONGER FINANCE IT. SECOND, THE FRG HAD INFORMED SOUTH AFRICA THAT IN THE NEXT BILATERAL CULTURAL AGREEMENT, NAMIBIA WOULD NO LONGER BE INCLUDED IN THE TERRITORY COVERED BY THE AGREEMENT. THIRD, THE FRG INTENDED TO CLOSE ITS CONSULATE IN WINDHOEK ON AUGUST 1. GENSCHER WARNED THAT THIS LAST POINT HAD NOT BEEN

FORMALLY DECIDED, BUT WOULD BE SOON DISCUSSED WITH THE BUNDESTAG LEADERS. HE THOUGHT THE MOVE WOULD BE AN EMOTIONAL ONE IN GERMANY, GIVEN THE 30,000 GERMANS IN NAMIBIA. HE ALSO THOUGHT THAT 80 PER CENT OF THE FRG PUBLIC WOULD BE OPPOSED TO THESE THREE DECISIONS.

10. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT HE WAS PLEASED WITH THE WAY THE FIVE HAD WORKED TOGETHER ON SOUTH AFRICA WITH REGARD TO NAMIBIA. INDIVIDUALLY THE FIVE HAD LIMITED LEVERAGE, BUT TOGETHER THEY WERE ACCOMPLISHING A GOOD DEAL. GENSCHER SHARED THIS VIEW. HE ALSO SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THE US ROLE IN SOUTH AFRICA WAS A POSITIVE ONE. THE SOVIETS NO LONGER WERE ABLE TO ACT AS THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE BLACK NATIONALISTS.

11. CIEC: THE SECRETARY ASKED UNDER SECRETARY COOPER TO
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COMMENT ON THE AFTERMATH OF THE CIEC. COOPER SAID THAT WE HAD NOT HEARD THE END OF CIEC. IT WOULD BE DISCUSSED AT THE UNGA IN SEPTEMBER, AND CRITICISM FROM THE LDC'S WAS CERTAIN TO COME. HE THOUGHT THAT NONETHELESS CIEC HAD GIVEN A NOTE OF REALISM TO THE NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE THAT HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY LACKING. HE THOUGHT ONE POSITIVE ELEMENT HAD BEEN THE COORDINATION BETWEEN THE INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES. HE WONDERED WHETHER WE SHOULD FIND A MECHANISM TO PRESERVE THAT COHESION. HE THOUGHT THE ROLE OF THE EC NINE HAD BEEN PARTICULARLY BENEFICIAL IN THIS CONTEXT. WE HAD SENT A CABLE TO BRUSSELS SUGGESTING THAT WE MIGHT TRY TO MAINTAIN THE STRUCTURE, POSSIBLY IN THE OECD CONTEXT BUT NOT AS PART OF THE OECD, WHICH HE WOULD NOT CONSIDER SUITABLE FOR FRANK DISCUSSIONS AND COORDINATION. HE THOUGHT WE SHOULD FIND SOME AD HOC GROUP THAT WOULD SERVE THE PURPOSE, JUST AS THE GROUP OF FIVE OR TEN HAD DONE IN THE FINANCIAL AREA. GENSCHER SAID THAT THE FRG TOO WAS INTERESTED IN CONTINUING THIS COOPERATION, AND IN EVERY INTERNATIONAL FORUM THAT HAD A BEARING ON NORTH-SOUTH ISSUES. HE NOTED THAT HE HAD FOUND TWO STRUCTURAL WEAKNESSES AT CIEC. THE FIRST WAS THAT THE EIGHT INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES WERE FULLY REPRESENTED, BUT THE GROUP OF 77 WAS HARDLY REPRESENTED AT ALL. THE SECOND WAS THAT THERE WERE THREE GROUPINGS -- INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES, OIL PRODUCERS, AND LDCS -- BUT THE LDCS WERE REPRESENTED BY OPEC COUNTRIES OF THOSE ABOUT TO BECOME SO, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF JAMAICA. THIS WOULD MAKE THE ENERGY DIALOGUE, FOR EXAMPLE, IMPOSSIBLE. COOPER AGREED WITH THESE COMMENTS.

12. THE SECRETARY ASKED WHAT NEWS THERE WAS ABOUT A POSSIBLE OIL PRICE INCREASE. COOPER SAID THAT THE POSITION SEEMED STILL FLUID, BUT THAT THE SAUDIS SEEMED TO REMAIN

INTERESTED IN PRICE STABILITY, ALTHOUGH THEY MIGHT GO UP
TO AN 8 PER CENT INCREASE, BUT WOULD ALSO HOLD PRICES
THROUGH 1978. THE SECRETARY SAID THIS WOULD BE CONSIS-

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TENT WITH WHAT FAHD HAD SAID WHEN HE WAS HERE.

13. US-CUBAN RELATIONS: GENSCHER ASKED ABOUT OUR
INTENTIONS WITH CUBA. THE SECRETARY SAID WE HAD DECIDED
AT THE OUTSET TO MOVE CAREFULLY WITH CUBA, FIRST ON THE
FISHERIES QUESTION; SECOND TO ESTABLISH AN INTEREST SECTION.
THE NEXT SET OF STEPS WOULD BE MORE DIFFICULT. WE WANTED
TO DETERMINE CUBAN INTENTIONS IN AFRICA, ON NATIONALIZED
US ASSETS, IN THE CARIBBEAN, AND IN PUERTO RICO. ALL OF
THESE SUBJECTS WOULD HAVE TO BE DISCUSSED BEFORE WE GOT
TO TRADE, WHICH IS THE SUBJECT THE CUBANS MOST WANT TO
DISCUSS, BUT WE ALSO HAVE A LARGE POLITICAL PROBLEM. THE
PANAMA CANAL TREATY IS APT TO BE SETTLED WITHIN THE NEXT
SIX WEEKS. IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO MOVE AHEAD WITH THAT
WHILE STILL MOVING RAPIDLY AHEAD WITH CUBA. TO DO SO COULD
OVERLOAD THE POLITICAL CIRCUITS HERE IN THE US. WE MIGHT
THEREFORE HAVE TO PROCEED SOMEWHAT MORE SLOWLY WITH
CUBA. GENSCHER SAID THAT THE FRG ALSO HAD DIPLOMATIC
RELATIONS WITH CUBA, AND WAS CONSIDERING WHETHER IT
SHOULD BECOME MORE ACTIVE WITH THAT COUNTRY. HE THOUGHT
PERHAPS THIS WAS A SUBJECT THAT THE NEXT FOUR POWER
MEETING MIGHT EXAMINE -- I.E. AN EXAMINATION OF OUR
CUBAN POLICIES. SECRETARY VANCE AGREED AND SAID THIS
SHOULD BE ON THE AGENDA FOR THE MEETING AT THE END OF
THE MONTH. VANCE

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RESPONDED THAT AT THE 1976 UNGA GROMYKO HAD INSISTED TO HIM THAT THE GERMANS NOT DWELL INCLUSIVELY ON PARITY AND COMMON CEILINGS. HE THOUGHT GROMYKO WOULD COME BACK TO THIS POINT. GENSCHER THOUGHT THE FRG WOULD FACE A REAL PROPAGANDA OFFENSIVE OVER MBFR; NOT ONLY FROM THE EAST, BUT ALSO FROM WESTERN EUROPEANS AND PERHAPS EVEN THE US. MANY PEOPLE SEEMED TO THINK MBFR MEANT DISARMAMENT FOR THE SOVIET UNION, WHICH WAS SIMPLY NOT THE CASE. THE SOVIETS SIMPLY WANTED TO MOVE A LITTLE TO THE EAST WHILE HAVING THE US MOVE ALL THE WAY BACK TO ITS SHORES. THE WEST HAD TO BE VERY CAREFUL TO REJECT ANY

EFFORT TO HAVE NATIONAL SUB-CEILINGS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. IT WAS THEREFORE IMPORTANT TO BE CAREFUL AS TO HOW WE HANDLE THE DATA QUESTION. IT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO PRESENT THE SOVIETS WITH AGGREGATE FIGURES OF MAJOR UNITS, BUT NOT TO BREAK DOWN SMALL UNITS INTO INDIVIDUAL NATIONAL FIGURES. IF WE MOVED TOWARD THE LATTER STEP, THIS WOULD ALLOW THE OTHER SIDE TO ARRIVE AT NATIONAL TOTALS. HE SAID THAT THE GERMAN PROPOSAL ON DATA RECENTLY PUT FORWARD IN NATO HAD NOT EXACTLY BEEN WARMLY RECEIVED. OTHER DELEGATIONS, EVEN THE US, HAD MADE CRITICAL REMARKS ABOUT IT. HE WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF THE US AND THE OTHER DELEGATIONS WOULD REVIEW THEIR POSITIONS, AND THE FRG WOULD REVIEW ITS OWN. HE WOULD ALSO INSTRUCT THE FRG DELEGATION IN NATO TO WORK CLOSELY WITH THE US SIDE. VANCE RESPONDED THAT OUR DIFFICULTY WITH THE GERMAN PROPOSAL WAS THAT IF NON-COMBAT UNITS WERE NOT INCLUDED, THEN WE COULD NOT RESOLVE THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN OUR ESTIMATES OF EASTERN FORCES AND THE NUMBERS THEY HAD PRESENTED. GENSCHER SAID THAT HE WAS PREPARED TO HAVE A FULL DISCUSSION OF THE FRG DATA PROPOSAL TO FIND A COMMON LINE. THIS DISCUSSION SHOULD PERMIT THE WESTERN SIDE TO RESOLVE THE DIVERGENCIES BETWEEN THE FIGURES, BUT WE OUGHT NOT TO ANTICIPATE THE ACTUAL NEGOTIATIONS. VANCE SAID HE ENTIRELY AGREED THAT THERE SHOULD BE A BROAD DISCUSSION TO WORK OUT A COMMON

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POSITION, WHICH MIGHT BE DISCUSSED FURTHER BETWEEN THEM AT THE UPCOMING MEETING IN PARIS.

6. TURKEY: VANCE ASKED FOR GENSCHER'S VIEWS ON THE SITUATION IN TURKEY. GENSCHER SAID WE WOULD HAVE TO WAIT TO SEE WHETHER ECEVIT COULD GAIN A MAJORITY TO SEE WHAT SORT OF POLICY HE WOULD FOLLOW, AND WHAT HE WOULD DO VIS-A-VIS THE ALLIANCE. THE SECRETARY THOUGHT THAT ECEVIT WOULD STAY IN THE ALLIANCE, WOULD PROBABLY BE MORE FLEXIBLE ON CYPRUS THAN DEMIREL, BUT MIGHT BE HOBbled BY HIS COALITION PARTNER ON THE AEGEAN TALKS. HE AGREED WE WOULD ALL HAVE TO WAIT AND SEE.

7. ISRAEL: ASKED ABOUT THE SITUATION IN ISRAEL, VANCE SAID THAT THE BEST GUESS WAS THAT BEGIN WOULD PUT TOGETHER A COALITION OF VARIOUS RELIGIOUS AND SPLINTER GROUPS. IT WAS DIFFICULT TO KNOW EXACTLY WHERE BEGIN STOOD ON THE ISSUES, AND TO JUDGE WHAT FLEXIBILITY HE WOULD BRING TO HIS OFFICE. BEGIN WOULD PROBABLY COME HERE AT THE END OF THIS MONTH OR IN EARLY JULY, AND VANCE WOULD THEN MAKE A RETURN TRIP TO ISRAEL. GENSCHER SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN IN ISRAEL IN MARCH, AND HAD MET WITH THE LEADER OF ONE OF THE TWO LIBERAL PARTIES THERE. THE LIBERAL LEADER HAD THOUGHT HIS PARTY COULD WORK

WITH BEGIN AND PUSH HIM TO TAKE A MORE FLEXIBLE ATTITUDE. GENSCHER SAID THERE WAS A BAD PROBLEM FOR THE GERMANS WITH BEGIN IN THAT HE HAD REFUSED PREVIOUSLY TO MEET WITH ANY GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE. BEGIN NOW SAID THAT HE WOULD MEET WITH GERMANS AFTER HE HAD FORMALLY ASSUMED OFFICE.

8. SOUTHERN AFRICA: THE SECRETARY SAID THAT ON SOUTHERN AFRICA, THE FIRST ROUND OF TALKS HAD BEEN USEFUL. WE HAD TALKED TO ALL SIDES INVOLVED, AND THE RESULTS HAD BEEN PROMISING ENOUGH TO LEAD US TO A SECOND ROUND, WHERE WE HOPED TO GET INTO THE DETAILS OF A CONSTITUTION. WE

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WOULD START DISCUSSIONS NEXT WEEK, ALONG WITH THE BRITISH, BUT WE DO NOT KNOW WHERE THESE WOULD COME OUT. IF THE RESULTS WERE GOOD ENOUGH, OWEN WOULD CALL FOR A CONFERENCE TO DISCUSS THE DRAFT CONSTITUTIONS AT LANCASTER HOUSE. IF THESE WERE SUCCESSFUL, THEN THE CONSTITUTION WOULD BE PUT TO THE RHODESIAN AND BRITISH PARLIAMENTS. IF THEY APPROVED IT, THEN A DATE WOULD BE SET FOR THE TAKE-OVER BY A TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT. HE SAID THERE WERE OBVIOUSLY A LOT OF IFS IN THIS SITUATION.

9. GENSCHER SAID THAT HE WANTED TO MENTION THREE IMPORTANT DECISIONS THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAD REACHED ON NAMIBIA. FIRST OF ALL, BEGINNING WITH THE 1978 SCHOOL YEAR, THE GERMAN SCHOOL IN WINDHOEK WOULD HAVE TO BE OPEN TO BLACK CHILDREN; OTHERWISE THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WOULD NO LONGER FINANCE IT. SECOND, THE FRG HAD INFORMED SOUTH AFRICA THAT IN THE NEXT BILATERAL CULTURAL AGREEMENT, NAMIBIA WOULD NO LONGER BE INCLUDED IN THE TERRITORY COVERED BY THE AGREEMENT. THIRD, THE FRG INTENDED TO CLOSE ITS CONSULATE IN WINDHOEK ON AUGUST 1. GENSCHER WARNED THAT THIS LAST POINT HAD NOT BEEN FORMALLY DECIDED, BUT WOULD BE SOON DISCUSSED WITH THE BUNDESTAG LEADERS. HE THOUGHT THE MOVE WOULD BE AN EMOTIONAL ONE IN GERMANY, GIVEN THE 30,000 GERMANS IN NAMIBIA. HE ALSO THOUGHT THAT 80 PER CENT OF THE FRG PUBLIC WOULD BE OPPOSED TO THESE THREE DECISIONS.

10. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT HE WAS PLEASED WITH THE WAY THE FIVE HAD WORKED TOGETHER ON SOUTH AFRICA WITH REGARD TO NAMIBIA. INDIVIDUALLY THE FIVE HAD LIMITED LEVERAGE, BUT TOGETHER THEY WERE ACCOMPLISHING A GOOD DEAL. GENSCHER SHARED THIS VIEW. HE ALSO SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THE US ROLE IN SOUTH AFRICA WAS A POSITIVE ONE. THE SOVIETS NO LONGER WERE ABLE TO ACT AS THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE BLACK NATIONALISTS.

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11. CIEC: THE SECRETARY ASKED UNDER SECRETARY COOPER TO COMMENT ON THE AFTERMATH OF THE CIEC. COOPER SAID THAT WE HAD NOT HEARD THE END OF CIEC. IT WOULD BE DISCUSSED AT THE UNGA IN SEPTEMBER, AND CRITICISM FROM THE LDC'S WAS CERTAIN TO COME. HE THOUGHT THAT NONETHELESS CIEC HAD GIVEN A NOTE OF REALISM TO THE NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE THAT HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY LACKING. HE THOUGHT ONE POSITIVE ELEMENT HAD BEEN THE COORDINATION BETWEEN THE INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES. HE WONDERED WHETHER WE SHOULD FIND A MECHANISM TO PRESERVE THAT COHESION. HE THOUGHT THE ROLE OF THE EC NINE HAD BEEN PARTICULARLY BENEFICIAL IN THIS CONTEXT. WE HAD SENT A CABLE TO BRUSSELS SUGGESTING THAT WE MIGHT TRY TO MAINTAIN THE STRUCTURE, POSSIBLY IN THE OECD CONTEXT BUT NOT AS PART OF THE OECD, WHICH HE WOULD NOT CONSIDER SUITABLE FOR FRANK DISCUSSIONS AND COORDINATION. HE THOUGHT WE SHOULD FIND SOME AD HOC GROUP THAT WOULD SERVE THE PURPOSE, JUST AS THE GROUP OF FIVE OR TEN HAD DONE IN THE FINANCIAL AREA. GENSCHER SAID THAT THE FRG TOO WAS INTERESTED IN CONTINUING THIS COOPERATION, AND IN EVERY INTERNATIONAL FORUM THAT HAD A BEARING ON NORTH-SOUTH ISSUES. HE NOTED THAT HE HAD FOUND TWO STRUCTURAL WEAKNESSES AT CIEC. THE FIRST WAS THAT THE EIGHT INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES WERE FULLY REPRESENTED, BUT THE GROUP OF 77 WAS HARDLY REPRESENTED AT ALL. THE SECOND WAS THAT THERE WERE THREE GROUPINGS -- INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES, OIL PRODUCERS, AND LDCS -- BUT THE LDCS WERE REPRESENTED BY OPEC COUNTRIES OF THOSE ABOUT TO BECOME SO, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF JAMAICA. THIS WOULD MAKE THE ENERGY DIALOGUE, FOR EXAMPLE, IMPOSSIBLE. COOPER AGREED WITH THESE COMMENTS.

12. THE SECRETARY ASKED WHAT NEWS THERE WAS ABOUT A POSSIBLE OIL PRICE INCREASE. COOPER SAID THAT THE POSITION SEEMED STILL FLUID, BUT THAT THE SAUDIS SEEMED TO REMAIN INTERESTED IN PRICE STABILITY, ALTHOUGH THEY MIGHT GO UP TO AN 8 PER CENT INCREASE, BUT WOULD ALSO HOLD PRICES

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THROUGH 1978. THE SECRETARY SAID THIS WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH WHAT FAHD HAD SAID WHEN HE WAS HERE.

13. US-CUBAN RELATIONS: GENSCHER ASKED ABOUT OUR INTENTIONS WITH CUBA. THE SECRETARY SAID WE HAD DECIDED AT THE OUTSET TO MOVE CAREFULLY WITH CUBA, FIRST ON THE FISHERIES QUESTION; SECOND TO ESTABLISH AN INTEREST SECTION. THE NEXT SET OF STEPS WOULD BE MORE DIFFICULT. WE WANTED TO DETERMINE CUBAN INTENTIONS

IN AFRICA, ON NATIONALIZED US ASSETS, IN THE CARIBBEAN,
AND IN PUERTO RICO. ALL OF THESE SUBJECTS WOULD
HAVE TO BE DISCUSSED BEFORE WE GOT TO TRADE, WHICH IS
THE SUBJECT THE CUBANS MOST WANT TO DISCUSS, BUT WE
ALSO HAVE A LARGE POLITICAL PROBLEM. THE PANAMA CANAL
TREATY IS APT TO BE SETTLED WITHIN THE NEXT SIX WEEKS.
IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO MOVE AHEAD WITH THAT WHILE
STILL MOVING RAPIDLY AHEAD WITH CUBA. TO DO SO COULD
OVERLOAD THE POLITICAL CIRCUITS HERE IN THE US. WE
MIGHT THEREFORE HAVE TO PROCEED SOMEWHAT MORE SLOWLY WITH
CUBA. GENSCHER SAID THAT THE FRG ALSO HAD DIPLOMATIC
RELATIONS WITH CUBA, AND WAS CONSIDERING WHETHER IT
SHOULD BECOME MORE ACTIVE WITH THAT COUNTRY. HE
THOUGHT PERHAPS THIS WAS A SUBJECT THAT THE NEXT FOUR
POWER MEETING MIGHT EXAMINE -- I.E. AN EXAMINATION OF
OUR CUBAN POLICIES. SECRETARY VANCE AGREED AND SAID
THIS SHOULD BE ON THE AGENDA FOR THE MEETING AT THE
END OF THE MONTH. VANCE

UNQUOTE CHRISTOPHER

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EXDIS FOR THE AMBASSADOR

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EXDIS USOECD FOR OECD PARIS: CAPE TOWN FOR EMB

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PINT, PINS, PORG, PDEV, ENRG, EAID, MASS, GW, UR, TU
SF, CU, IS, US

SUBJECT: FRG FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER'S MEETING WITH
SECRETARY VANCE

SUMMARY: ON HIS WAY FROM MEXICO CITY TO PARIS JUNE 10, FRG
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FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER STOPPED OFF BRIEFLY IN WASHINGTON FOR WIDE RANGING DISCUSSION OF CURRENT ISSUES WITH THE SECRETARY. GENSCHER SAID THAT HE PREFERRED THAT BREZHNEV VISIT THE FRG ONLY AFTER HIS PROJECTED US TRIP. DURING HIS OWN MOSCOW VISIT HE EXPECTED THE FOCUS TO BE ON BELGRADE CONFERENCE, MBFR, ROLE OF WARSAW PACT IN NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE, AFRICA, AND THE MIDDLE EAST. THE SECRETARY REITERATED THAT AT BELGRADE WE WANTED FRANK AND STRAIGHTFORWARD REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION BUT WOULD AVOID POLEMICS. THE SOVIETS ALSO SEEMED TO WANT NON-CONFRONTATIONAL APPROACH. ON SALT, SECRETARY STRESSED THAT PROGRESS WAS SLOW, BUT THAT WE WERE NOW ON AN ESTABLISHED NEGOTIATING TRACK. GENSCHER EXPRESSED FRG CONCERN OVER RANGE OF SOVIET HEAVY MISSILES AS WELL AS THAT OF CRUISE MISSILES. GENSCHER PREDICTED THAT ON MBFR FRG WOULD FACE HEAVY BARRAGE OF PROPAGANDA NOT ONLY FROM EAST, BUT FROM ALL SIDES. HE STRESSED NEED TO REJECT INCLUSION OF NATIONAL SUB-CEILINGS IN NEGOTIATIONS. IT WOULD BE

ACCEPTABLE TO PRESENT SOVIETS WITH AGGREGATE FIGURES OF MAJOR UNITS BUT NOT TO BREAK DOWN SMALLER UNITS INTO INDIVIDUAL NATIONAL FIGURES. IN DISCUSSION OF SOUTHERN AFRICA GENSCHER MENTIONED THREE FRG DECISIONS ON NAMIBIA: INTEGRATION NEXT YEAR OF GERMAN SCHOOL IN WINDHOEK, NOTICE TO SOUTH AFRICA THAT NAMIBIA WOULD NOT BE INCLUDED IN NEXT BILATERAL CULTURAL AGREEMENT, AND DECISION TO CLOSE FRG CONSULATE IN WINDHOEK AUGUST 1. IN DISCUSSION OF CIEC, GENSCHER NOTED TWO STRUCTURAL WEAKNESSES: WHILE EIGHT INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES WERE FULLY REPRESENTED, GROUP OF 77 WAS HARDLY REPRESENTED AT ALL; SECONDLY, LDC'S WERE LARGELY REPRESENTED BY PRESENT OR POTENTIAL OPEC COUNTRIES RATHER THAN AS INDEPENDENT GROUP. DISCUSSION ALSO INCLUDED EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON NEW GOVERNMENTS IN TURKEY AND ISRAEL AND DEVELOPMENT OF US RELATIONS WITH CUBA. END SUMMARY.

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1. FRG-SOVIET RELATIONS: CONCERNING GENSCHER'S FORTH-COMING VISIT TO MOSCOW, HE SAID THAT A DATE FOR BREZHNEV'S VISIT TO BONN WOULD BE ON THE AGENDA. HE UNDERSTOOD THAT BREZHNEV WAS ALSO COMING TO THE US AND WOULD LIKE TO SEE HIM VISIT THE FRG ONLY AFTER THE US TRIP. THERE REMAINED THE OPEN PROBLEM OF THE THREE BILATERAL AGREEMENTS STILL UNRESOLVED BECAUSE OF THE BERLIN ISSUE. THE GERMAN POSITION ON THESE AGREEMENTS HAD NOT CHANGED. HOWEVER, THESE AGREEMENTS WOULD NOT BE THE CENTRAL ISSUE IN HIS MOSCOW TALKS, WHICH WOULD FOCUS ON THE BELGRADE CONFERENCE, THE MIDDLE EAST, AFRICA, THE ROLE OF THE WARSAW PACT STATES IN THE NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE AND MBFR. CONCERNING THE LATTER POINT, HE RECALLED THAT GROMYKO HAD OFFERED AT LAST YEAR'S UNGA TO MAKE CONCESSIONS IN THE BERLIN AREA IF THE FRG WOULD BE FORTH-COMING IN THE MBFR CONTEXT.

2. CSCE PREPARATIONS: VANCE SAID OUR POSITION WITH REGARD TO BELGRADE WAS UNCHANGED. WE INTENDED TO CONCENTRATE ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. THE US WANTED A FRANK AND STRAIGHTFORWARD REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION BUT WOULD AVOID POLEMICS. THE MAJORITY OF THE CSCE COMMISSION SUPPORTED THIS VIEW. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT NONETHELESS WE AND THE FRG WOULD HAVE TO CONFER ON OUR POSITIONS AS WE APPROACHED BELGRADE. IN ANSWER TO GENSCHER'S QUESTION, HE SAID THAT THE LEADER OF THE US DELEGATION WOULD BE DEPUTY SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER, AND THAT THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE GROUP WOULD BE AMBASSADOR SHERER. GENSCHER SAID HE WAS VERY PLEASED TO LEARN OF THE HIGH RANK OF THE US REPRESENTATIVES. THE FRG SIDE WOULD BE REPRESENTED BY GUENTHER VAN WELL, WITH PER FISCHER AS THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR. HE NOTED THAT FISCHER HAD FORMERLY BEEN THE GERMAN ABASSADOR TO ISRAEL. GENSCHER ASKED THE SECRETARY HOW HE ASSESSED THE SOVIET REACTION TO THE USG CSCE REPORT. THE SECRETARY SAID HE HAD TALKED TO THE

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SOVIETS YESTERDAY, AND THEY HAD SEEMED FAIRLY RELAXED. GENSCHER SAID THAT THE GDR HAD REACTED MUCH MORE SHARPLY, APPARENTLY IN RESPONSE TO THE WEST GERMAN NEWS MEDIA'S STRESS ON THE BERLIN ASPECT OF OUR REPORT.

3. SALT: SECRETARY VANCE REPORTED ON SALT, STATING THAT PROGRESS WAS VERY SLOW, THAT THE ISSUES BETWEEN US REMAINED SHARP ON CRUISE AND HEAVY MISSILES, ON BACKFIRE, AND ON THE QUESTION OF WHAT WENT WHERE IN THE PROPOSED THREE-PHASE STRUCTURE. HOWEVER, THE ATMOSPHERE HAD BEEN GOOD WITH GROMYKO IN GENEVA. WE WOULD CONTINUE TO DISCUSS SALT AT THREE LEVELS DURING THE SUMMER: FIRST AT

THE TECHNICAL LEVEL, SECOND, BETWEEN THE SECRETARY AND DOBRYNIN HERE, AND THIRD, WITH GROMYKO IN VIENNA IN THE FIRST WEEK OF SEPTEMBER. GROMYKO WOULD THEN COME TO THE US AT THE END OF SEPTEMBER TO ATTEND THE UNGA, AND THERE WOULD BE FURTHER BILATERALS THEN. IT WAS A LONG PROCESS, BUT WE WERE NOW ON A SET NEGOTIATING TRACK. THE US SIDE WAS SETTING NO TIME LIMIT, AND WE ARE NOT RUSHING TO GET AN AGREEMENT.

4. GENSCHER SAID THAT WHAT WAS OF GREAT CONCERN TO THE FRG WAS THE RANGE OF THE SOVIET HEAVY MISSILES. HE WAS ALSO INTERESTED IN THE RANGE OF THE CRUISE MISSILES IN A SALT AGREEMENT. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT THIS RAISED THE QUESTION OF NON-CIRCUMVENTION. WARNKE WOULD BE RAISING THIS SUBJECT IN NATO, AND AFTER THAT DISCUSSION, AND AFTER A NATO POSITION HAD BEEN DEVELOPED, WE WOULD WANT TO RAISE THIS SUBJECT QUICKLY WITH THE SOVIETS. IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR US TO HAVE THE INITIATIVE IN THIS AREA, AND WE WANTED TO HAVE BROAD LANGUAGE ON NON-CIRCUMVENTION TO PUT FORWARD TO THE SOVIETS. HENCE OUR DESIRE TO TAKE UP THE MATTER EARLY IN NATO. WARNKE HAD BEEN URGED TO GET OUR PROPOSALS TO NATO AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

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5. MBFR: THE SECRETARY ASKED WHAT THE SOVIETS WOULD DISCUSS ON MBFR WITH GENSCHER IN MOSCOW. GENSCHER RESPONDED THAT AT THE 1976 UNGA GROMYKO HAD INSISTED TO HIM THAT THE GERMANS NOT DWELL INCLUSIVELY ON PARITY AND COMMON CEILINGS. HE THOUGHT GROMYKO WOULD COME BACK TO THIS POINT. GENSCHER THOUGHT THE FRG WOULD FACE A REAL PROPAGANDA OFFENSIVE OVER MBFR; NOT ONLY FROM THE EAST, BUT ALSO FROM WESTERN EUROPEANS AND PERHAPS EVEN THE US. MANY PEOPLE SEEMED TO THINK MBFR MEANT DISARMAMENT FOR THE SOVIET UNION, WHICH WAS SIMPLY NOT THE CASE. THE SOVIETS SIMPLY WANTED TO MOVE A LITTLE TO THE EAST WHILE HAVING THE US MOVE ALL THE WAY BACK TO ITS SHORES. THE WEST HAD TO BE VERY CAREFUL TO REJECT ANY EFFORT TO HAVE NATIONAL SUB-CEILINGS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. IT WAS THEREFORE IMPORTANT TO BE CAREFUL AS TO HOW WE HANDLE THE DATA QUESTION. IT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO PRESENT THE SOVIETS WITH AGGREGATE FIGURES OF MAJOR UNITS, BUT NOT TO BREAK DOWN SMALL UNITS INTO INDIVIDUAL NATIONAL FIGURES. IF WE MOVED TOWARD THE LATTER STEP, THIS WOULD ALLOW THE OTHER SIDE TO ARRIVE AT NATIONAL TOTALS. HE SAID THAT THE GERMAN PROPOSAL ON DATA RECENTLY PUT FORWARD IN NATO HAD NOT EXACTLY BEEN WARMLY RECEIVED. OTHER DELEGATIONS, EVEN THE US, HAD MADE CRITICAL REMARKS ABOUT IT. HE WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF THE US AND THE OTHER DELEGATIONS WOULD REVIEW THEIR POSITIONS,

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FOLLOWING REPEAT STATE 135802 ACTION BELGRADE DATED JUNE 16:

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PRETORIA TEL AVIV MBFR VIENNA NATO PARIS CAPE TOWN 12 JUN 77
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SF, CU, IS, US

SUBJECT: FRG FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER'S MEETING WITH
SECRETARY VANCE

SUMMARY; ON HIS WAY FROM MEXICO CITY TO PARIS JUNE 10, FRG FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER STOPPED OFF BRIEFLY IN WASHINGTON FOR WIDE RANGING DISCUSSION OF CURRENT ISSUES WITH THE SECRETARY. GENSCHER SAID THAT HE PREFERRED THAT BREZHNEV VISIT THE FRG ONLY AFTER HIS PROJECTED US TRIP. DURING HIS OWN MOSCOW VISIT HE EXPECTED THE FOCUS TO BE ON BELGRADE CONFERENCE, MBFR, ROLE OF WARSAW PACT IN NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE, AFRICA, AND THE MIDDLE EAST. THE SECRETARY REITERATED THAT AT BELGRADE WE WANTED FRANK AND STRAIGHTFORWARD REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION BUT WOULD AVOID POLEMICS. THE SOVIETS ALSO SEEMED TO WANT NON-CONFRONTATIONAL APPROACH. ON SALT, SECRETARY STRESSED THAT PROGRESS WAS SLOW, BUT THAT WE WERE NOW ON AN ESTABLISHED NEGOTIATING TRACK. GENSCHER EXPRESSED FRG CONCERN OVER RANGE OF SOVIET HEAVY MISSILES AS WELL AS THAT OF CRUISE MISSILES. GENSCHER PREDICTED THAT ON MBFR FRG WOULD FACE HEAVY BARRAGE OF PROPAGANDA NOT ONLY FROM EAST, BUT FROM ALL SIDES. HE STRESSED NEED TO REJECT INCLUSION OF NATIONAL SUB-CEILINGS IN NEGOTIATIONS. IT WOULD BE

ACCEPTABLE TO PRESENT SOVIETS WITH AGGREGATE FIGURES OF MAJOR UNITS BUT NOT TO BREAK DOWN SMALLER UNITS INTO INDIVIDUAL NATIONAL FIGURES. IN DISCUSSION OF SOUTHERN AFRICA GENSCHER MENTIONED THREE FRG DECISIONS ON NAMIBIA: INTEGRATION NEXT YEAR OF GERMAN SCHOOL IN WINDHOEK, NOTICE TO SOUTH AFRICA THAT NAMIBIA WOULD NOT BE INCLUDED IN NEXT BILATERAL CULTURAL AGREEMENT, AND DECISION TO CLOSE FRG CONSULATE IN WINDHOEK AUGUST 1. IN DISCUSSION

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OF CIEC, GENSCHER NOTED TWO STRUCTURAL WEAKNESSES: WHILE EIGHT INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES WERE FULLY REPRESENTED, GROUP OF 77 WAS HARDLY REPRESENTED AT ALL; SECONDLY, LDC'S WERE LARGELY REPRESENTED BY PRESENT OR POTENTIAL OPEC COUNTRIES RATHER THAN AS INDEPENDENT GROUP. DISCUSSION ALSO INCLUDED EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON NEW GOVERNMENTS IN TURKEY AND ISRAEL AND DEVELOPMENT OF US RELATIONS WITH CUBA. END SUMMARY.

1. FRG-SOVIET RELATIONS: CONCERNING GENSCHER'S FORTHCOMING VISIT TO MOSCOW, HE SAID THAT A DATE FOR BREZHNEV'S VISIT TO BONN WOULD BE ON THE AGENDA. HE UNDERSTOOD THAT BREZHNEV WAS ALSO COMING TO THE US AND WOULD LIKE TO SEE HIM VISIT THE FRG ONLY AFTER THE US TRIP. THERE REMAINED THE OPEN PROBLEM OF THE THREE BILATERAL AGREEMENTS STILL UNRESOLVED BECAUSE OF THE BERLIN ISSUE. THE GERMAN POSITION ON THESE AGREEMENTS HAD NOT

CHANGED. HOWEVER, THESE AGREEMENTS WOULD NOT BE THE CENTRAL ISSUE IN HIS MOSCOW TALKS, WHICH WOULD FOCUS ON THE BELGRADE CONFERENCE, THE MIDDLE EAST, AFRICA, THE ROLE OF THE WARSAW PACT STATES IN THE NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE AND MBFR. CONCERNING THE LATTER POINT, HE RECALLED THAT GROMYKO HAD OFFERED AT LAST YEAR'S UNGA TO MAKE CONCESSIONS IN THE BERLIN AREA IF THE FRG WOULD BE FORTHCOMING IN THE MBFR CONTEXT.

2. CSCE PREPARATIONS: VANCE SAID OUR POSITION WITH REGARD TO BELGRADE WAS UNCHANGED. WE INTENDED TO CONCENTRATE ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. THE US WANTED A FRANK AND STRAIGHTFORWARD REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION BUT WOULD AVOID POLEMICS. THE MAJORITY OF THE CSCE COMMISSION SUPPORTED THIS VIEW. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT NONETHELESS WE AND THE FRG WOULD HAVE TO CONFER ON OUR POSITIONS AS WE APPROACHED BELGRADE. IN ANSWER TO GENSCHER'S QUESTION, HE SAID THAT THE LEADER OF THE US DELEGATION WOULD BE DEPUTY SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER, AND
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THAT THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE GROUP WOULD BE AMBASSADOR SHERER. GENSCHER SAID HE WAS VERY PLEASED TO LEARN OF THE HIGH RANK OF THE US REPRESENTATIVES. THE FRG SIDE WOULD BE REPRESENTED BY GUENTHER VAN WELL, WITH PER FISCHER AS THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR. HE NOTED THAT FISCHER HAD FORMERLY BEEN THE GERMAN ABASSADOR TO ISRAEL. GENSCHER ASKED THE SECRETARY HOW HE ASSESSED THE SOVIET REACTION TO THE USG CSCE REPORT. THE SECRETARY SAID HE HAD TALKED TO THE SOVIETS YESTERDAY, AND THEY HAD SEEMED FAIRLY RELAXED. GENSCHER SAID THAT THE GDR HAD REACTED MUCH MORE SHARPLY, APPARENTLY IN RESPONSE TO THE WEST GERMAN NEWS MEDIA'S STRESS ON THE BERLIN ASPECT OF OUR REPORT.

3. SALT: SECRETARY VANCE REPORTED ON SALT, STATING THAT PROGRESS WAS VERY SLOW, THAT THE ISSUES BETWEEN US REMAINED SHARP ON CRUISE AND HEAVY MISSILES, ON BACKFIRE, AND ON THE QUESTION OF WHAT WENT WHERE IN THE PROPOSED THREE-PHASE STRUCTURE. HOWEVER, THE ATMOSPHERE HAD BEEN GOOD WITH GROMYKO IN GENEVA. WE WOULD CONTINUE TO DISCUSS SALT AT THREE LEVELS DURING THE SUMMER: FIRST AT THE TECHNICAL LEVEL, SECOND, BETWEEN THE SECRETARY AND DOBRYNIN HERE, AND THIRD, WITH GROMYKO IN VIENNA IN THE FIRST WEEK OF SEPTEMBER. GROMYKO WOULD THEN COME TO THE US AT THE END OF SEPTEMBER TO ATTEND THE UNGA, AND THERE WOULD BE FURTHER BILATERALS THEN. IT WAS A LONG PROCESS, BUT WE WERE NOW ON A SET NEGOTIATING TRACK. THE US SIDE WAS SETTING NO TIME LIMIT, AND WE ARE NOT RUSHING TO GET AN AGREEMENT.

4. GENSCHER SAID THAT WHAT WAS OF GREAT CONCERN TO THE FRG WAS THE RANGE OF THE SOVIET HEAVY MISSILES. HE WAS ALSO INTERESTED IN THE RANGE OF THE CRUISE MISSILES IN

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A SALT AGREEMENT. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT THIS RAISED THE QUESTION OF NON-CIRCUMVENTION. WARNKE WOULD BE RAISING THIS SUBJECT IN NATO, AND AFTER THAT DISCUSSION, AND AFTER A NATO POSITION HAD BEEN DEVELOPED, WE WOULD WANT TO RAISE THIS SUBJECT QUICKLY WITH THE SOVIETS. IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR US TO HAVE THE INITIATIVE IN THIS AREA, AND WE WANTED TO HAVE BROAD LANGUAGE ON NON-CIRCUMVENTION TO PUT FORWARD TO THE SOVIETS. HENCE OUR DESIRE TO TAKE UP THE MATTER EARLY IN NATO. WARNKE HAD BEEN URGED TO GET OUR PROPOSALS TO NATO AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

5. MBFR: THE SECRETARY ASKED WHAT THE SOVIETS WOULD DISCUSS ON MBFR WITH GENSCHER IN MOSCOW. GENSCHER RESPONDED THAT AT THE 1976 UNGA GROMYKO HAD INSISTED TO HIM THAT THE GERMANS NOT DWELL INCLUSIVELY ON PARITY AND COMMON CEILINGS. HE THOUGHT GROMYKO WOULD COME BACK TO THIS POINT. GENSCHER THOUGHT THE FRG WOULD FACE A REAL PROPAGANDA OFFENSIVE OVER MBFR; NOT ONLY FROM THE EAST, BUT ALSO FROM WESTERN EUROPEANS AND PERHAPS EVEN THE US. MANY PEOPLE SEEMED TO THINK MBFR MEANT DISARMAMENT FOR THE SOVIET UNION, WHICH WAS SIMPLY NOT THE CASE. THE SOVIETS SIMPLY WANTED TO MOVE A LITTLE TO THE EAST WHILE HAVING THE US MOVE ALL THE WAY BACK TO ITS SHORES. THE WEST HAD TO BE VERY CAREFUL TO REJECT ANY EFFORT TO HAVE NATIONAL SUB-CEILINGS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. IT WAS THEREFORE IMPORTANT TO BE CAREFUL AS TO HOW WE HANDLE THE DATA QUESTION. IT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO PRESENT THE SOVIETS WITH AGGREGATE FIGURES OF MAJOR UNITS, BUT NOT TO BREAK DOWN SMALL UNITS INTO INDIVIDUAL NATIONAL FIGURES. IF WE MOVED TOWARD THE LATTER STEP, THIS WOULD ALLOW THE OTHER SIDE TO ARRIVE AT NATIONAL TOTALS. HE SAID THAT THE GERMAN PROPOSAL ON DATA RECENTLY PUT FORWARD IN NATO HAD NOT EXACTLY BEEN WARMLY RECEIVED. OTHER DELEGATIONS, EVEN THE US, HAD MADE CRITICAL REMARKS ABOUT IT. HE WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF THE

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US AND THE OTHER DELEGATIONS WOULD REVIEW THEIR POSITIONS, AND THE FRG WOULD REVIEW ITS OWN. HE WOULD ALSO INSTRUCT THE FRG DELEGATION IN NATO TO WORK CLOSELY WITH THE US SIDE. VANCE RESPONDED THAT OUR DIFFICULTY WITH THE GERMAN PROPOSAL WAS THAT IF NON-COMBAT UNITS WERE NOT

INCLUDED, THEN WE COULD NOT RESOLVE THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN OUR ESTIMATES OF EASTERN FORCES AND THE NUMBERS THEY HAD PRESENTED. GENSCHER SAID THAT HE WAS PREPARED TO HAVE A FULL DISCUSSION OF THE FRG DATA PROPOSAL TO FIND A COMMON LINE. THIS DISCUSSION SHOULD PERMIT THE WESTERN SIDE TO RESOLVE THE DIVERGENCIES BETWEEN THE FIGURES, BUT WE OUGHT NOT TO ANTICIPATE THE ACTUAL NEGOTIATIONS. VANCE SAID HE ENTIRELY AGREED THAT THERE SHOULD BE A BROAD DISCUSSION TO WORK OUT A COMMON POSITION, WHICH MIGHT BE DISCUSSED FURTHER BETWEEN THEM AT THE UPCOMING MEETING IN PARIS.

6. TURKEY: VANCE ASKED FOR GENSCHER'S VIEWS ON THE SITUATION IN TURKEY. GENSCHER SAID WE WOULD HAVE TO WAIT TO SEE WHETHER ECEVIT COULD GAIN A MAJORITY TO SEE WHAT SORT OF POLICY HE WOULD FOLLOW, AND WHAT HE WOULD DO VIS-A-VIS THE ALLIANCE. THE SECRETARY THOUGHT THAT ECEVIT WOULD STAY IN THE ALLIANCE, WOULD PROBABLY BE MORE FLEXIBLE ON CYPRUS THAN DEMIREL, BUT MIGHT BE HOBBOLED BY HIS COALITION PARTNER ON THE AEGEAN TALKS. HE AGREED WE WOULD ALL HAVE TO WAIT AND SEE.

7. ISRAEL: ASKED ABOUT THE SITUATION IN ISRAEL, VANCE SAID THAT THE BEST GUESS WAS THAT BEGIN WOULD PUT TOGETHER A COALITION OF VARIOUS RELIGIOUS AND SPLINTER GROUPS. IT WAS DIFFICULT TO KNOW EXACTLY WHERE BEGIN STOOD ON THE ISSUES, AND TO JUDGE WHAT FLEXIBILITY HE WOULD BRING TO HIS OFFICE. BEGIN WOULD PROBABLY COME

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HERE AT THE END OF THIS MONTH OR IN EARLY JULY, AND VANCE WOULD THEN MAKE A RETURN TRIP TO ISRAEL. GENSCHER SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN IN ISRAEL IN MARCH, AND HAD MET WITH THE LEADER OF ONE OF THE TWO LIBERAL PARTIES THERE. THE LIBERAL LEADER HAD THOUGHT HIS PARTY COULD WORK WITH BEGIN AND PUSH HIM TO TAKE A MORE FLEXIBLE ATTITUDE. GENSCHER SAID THERE WAS A BAD PROBLEM FOR THE GERMANS WITH BEGIN IN THAT HE HAD REFUSED PREVIOUSLY TO MEET WITH ANY GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE. BEGIN NOW SAID THAT HE WOULD MEET WITH GERMANS AFTER HE HAD FORMALLY ASSUMED OFFICE.

8. SOUTHERN AFRICA: THE SECRETARY SAID THAT ON SOUTHERN AFRICA, THE FIRST ROUND OF TALKS HAD BEEN USEFUL. WE HAD TALKED TO ALL SIDES INVOLVED, AND THE RESULTS HAD BEEN PROMISING ENOUGH TO LEAD US TO A SECOND ROUND, WHERE WE HOPED TO GET INTO THE DETAILS OF A CONSTITUTION. WE WOULD START DISCUSSIONS NEXT WEEK, ALONG WITH THE BRITISH, BUT WE DO NOT KNOW WHERE THESE WOULD COME OUT. IF THE RESULTS WERE GOOD ENOUGH, OWEN WOULD CALL FOR A CONFERENCE TO DISCUSS THE DRAFT CONSTITUTIONS AT LANCASTER HOUSE.

IF THESE WERE SUCCESSFUL, THEN THE CONSTITUTION WOULD BE PUT TO THE RHODESIAN AND BRITISH PARLIAMENTS. IF THEY APPROVED IT, THEN A DATE WOULD BE SET FOR THE TAKE-OVER BY A TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT. HE SAID THERE WERE OBVIOUSLY A LOT OF IFS IN THIS SITUATION.

9. GENSCHER SAID THAT HE WANTED TO MENTION THREE IMPORTANT DECISIONS THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAD REACHED ON NAMIBIA. FIRST OF ALL, BEGINNING WITH THE 1978 SCHOOL YEAR, THE GERMAN SCHOOL IN WINDHOEK WOULD HAVE TO BE OPEN TO BLACK CHILDREN; OTHERWISE THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WOULD NO LONGER FINANCE IT. SECOND, THE FRG HAD INFORMED SOUTH AFRICA THAT IN THE NEXT BILATERAL CULTURAL AGREEMENT, NAMIBIA WOULD NO LONGER BE INCLUDED IN THE TERRITORY COVERED BY THE AGREEMENT. THIRD, THE FRG IN-

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TENDED TO CLOSE ITS CONSULATE IN WINDHOEK ON AUGUST 1. GENSCHER WARNED THAT THIS LAST POINT HAD NOT BEEN FORMALLY DECIDED, BUT WOULD BE SOON DISCUSSED WITH THE BUNDESTAG LEADERS. HE THOUGHT THE MOVE WOULD BE AN EMOTIONAL ONE IN GERMANY, GIVEN THE 30,000 GERMANS IN NAMIBIA. HE ALSO THOUGHT THAT 80 PER CENT OF THE FRG PUBLIC WOULD BE OPPOSED TO THESE THREE DECISIONS.

10. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT HE WAS PLEASED WITH THE WAY THE FIVE HAD WORKED TOGETHER ON SOUTH AFRICA WITH REGARD TO NAMIBIA. INDIVIDUALLY THE FIVE HAD LIMITED LEVERAGE, BUT TOGETHER THEY WERE ACCOMPLISHING A GOOD DEAL. GENSCHER SHARED THIS VIEW. HE ALSO SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THE US ROLE IN SOUTH AFRICA WAS A POSITIVE ONE. THE SOVIETS NO LONGER WERE ABLE TO ACT AS THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE BLACK NATIONALISTS.

11. CIEC: THE SECRETARY ASKED UNDER SECRETARY COOPER TO COMMENT ON THE AFTERMATH OF THE CIEC. COOPER SAID THAT WE HAD NOT HEARD THE END OF CIEC. IT WOULD BE DISCUSSED AT THE UNGA IN SEPTEMBER, AND CRITICISM FROM THE LDC'S WAS CERTAIN TO COME. HE THOUGHT THAT NONETHELESS CIEC HAD GIVEN A NOTE OF REALISM TO THE NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE THAT HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY LACKING. HE THOUGHT ONE POSITIVE ELEMENT HAD BEEN THE COORDINATION BETWEEN THE INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES. HE WONDERED WHETHER WE SHOULD FIND A MECHANISM TO PRESERVE THAT COHESION. HE THOUGHT THE ROLE OF THE EC NINE HAD BEEN PARTICULARLY BENEFICIAL IN THIS CONTEXT. WE HAD SENT A CABLE TO BRUSSELS SUGGESTING THAT WE MIGHT TRY TO MAINTAIN THE STRUCTURE, POSSIBLY IN THE OECD CONTEXT BUT NOT AS PART OF THE OECD, WHICH HE WOULD NOT CONSIDER SUITABLE FOR FRANK DISCUSSIONS AND COORDINATION. HE THOUGHT WE SHOULD FIND SOME AD HOC GROUP THAT

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WOULD SERVE THE PURPOSE, JUST AS THE GROUP OF FIVE OR TEN HAD DONE IN THE FINANCIAL AREA. GENSCHER SAID THAT THE FRG TOO WAS INTERESTED IN CONTINUING THIS COOPERATION, AND IN EVERY INTERNATIONAL FORUM THAT HAD A BEARING ON NORTH-SOUTH ISSUES. HE NOTED THAT HE HAD FOUND TWO STRUCTURAL WEAKNESSES AT CIEC. THE FIRST WAS THAT THE EIGHT INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES WERE FULLY REPRESENTED, BUT THE GROUP OF 77 WAS HARDLY REPRESENTED AT ALL. THE SECOND WAS THAT THERE WERE THREE GROUPINGS -- INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES, OIL PRODUCERS, AND LDCE -- BUT THE LDCE WERE REPRESENTED BY OPEC COUNTRIES OF THOSE ABOUT TO BECOME SO, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF JAMAICA. THIS WOULD MAKE THE ENERGY DIALOGUE, FOR EXAMPLE, IMPOSSIBLE. COOPER AGREED WITH THESE COMMENTS.

12. THE SECRETARY ASKED WHAT NEWS THERE WAS ABOUT A POSSIBLE OIL PRICE INCREASE. COOPER SAID THAT THE POSITION SEEMED STILL FLUID, BUT THAT THE SAUDIS SEEMED TO REMAIN INTERESTED IN PRICE STABILITY, ALTHOUGH THEY MIGHT GO UP TO AN 8 PER CENT INCREASE, BUT WOULD ALSO HOLD PRICES THROUGH 1978. THE SECRETARY SAID THIS WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH WHAT FAHD HAD SAID WHEN HE WAS HERE.

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